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The sense that I am the author of my own actions, including the ability to distinguish
my own from other people’s actions, is a fundamental building block of our sense of
self, on the one hand, and successful social interactions, on the other. Using cognitive
neuroscience techniques, researchers have attempted to elucidate the functional basis
of this intriguing phenomenon, also trying to explain pathological abnormalities of
action awareness in certain psychiatric and neurological disturbances. Recent conceptual,
technological, and methodological advances suggest several interesting and necessary
new leads for future research on the neuroscience of agency. Here I will describe new
frontiers for the field such as the need for novel and multifactorial paradigms, anatomically
plausible network models for the sense of agency, investigations of the temporal dynamics
during agentic processing and ecologically valid virtual reality (VR) applications.
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INTRODUCTION
The cognitive neuroscience approach to the sense of agency—that
is, the sense that it is me or someone else causing or control-
ling a movement or change in the outside world (e.g., Gallagher,
2000)—views it as an operationalizable construct that can be bro-
ken down into paradigms amenable to neuroscience techniques
(Christoff et al., 2011), such as functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), electro- or magnetoencephalography (EEG or
MEG), and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Yet, from
the late 1990s to date, the sense of agency received only little
attention in neuroscience research, despite its relevance to a vari-
ety of psychiatric and neurological syndromes (Blakemore et al.,
2002) and its key role for self-consciousness and social interac-
tion (Gallagher, 2000; De Jaegher and Froese, 2009). Compared
with related areas of interest in cognitive neuroscience, such as
the mirror neuron system or theory of mind, the number of
studies in cognitive neuroscience which addressed the sense of
agency can be considered small. Sperduti and colleagues (2011)
in a recent meta-analysis identified only 31 neuroimaging stud-
ies directly related to the sense of agency and published since
1998. Half of these studies addressed only one of many different
aspects of agency processing in the brain, namely, the identifica-
tion of brain regions that respond to an intact versus disrupted
sense of self-agency by introducing sensorimotor congruence ver-
sus incongruence (Sperduti et al., 2011). However, advancing
technologies, such as in virtual reality (VR) and robot systems,
developments in neuroscience methodologies, such as analyses
of connectivity or interactions between brain regions, as well as
conceptual developments of the sense of agency have opened up
new, intriguing doors for the neuroscience of agency. In the fol-
lowing, I will introduce some recent developments in the field,
current outstanding questions, and consequent directions for
future research.
MULTIFACTORIAL SENSE OF AGENCY: THE PERFECT
EXPERIMENT
An example of the various stages and processes involved in agen-
tic processing is writing this article. It started with my intention
to write this article because I considered the topic important.
Now, while I am writing, efference-based motor control signals
make me hit certain keys on my keyboard. At the same time,
self-monitoring processes and the visual feedback frommy screen
prevent me from making typos and help to correct myself when
a wrong key has been hit or when a key remained unresponsive
to my key press. Some of these processes may happen automat-
ically without me reflecting upon them or being able to control
them voluntarily. Yet, I implicitly experience myself as the agent
who is thinking these words and putting them onto paper, I
might become aware of the unresponsive key, and eventually
I will explicitly experience myself as the author of this article
as it gets published. This example highlights that the sense of
agency is complex and dynamic, multilayered, and multifactorial
(Wegner and Sparrow, 2004; Pacherie, 2008; Synofzik et al., 2008;
Gallagher, 2012). Nonetheless, different authors have put differ-
ent emphasis on single aspects, strictly conceiving the sense of
agency in very narrow ways. Some authors have proposed motor
efference signals andmotor intention, such as during active versus
passive movements or temporal binding of action and action out-
come during voluntary versus non-voluntary movements, as pri-
mary constituents for the sense of agency (Haggard, 2005; Tsakiris
et al., 2005; Moore and Obhi, 2012), some have promoted a key
role of proprioceptive signals (Balslev et al., 2007), others have
explained the sense of agency rather cognitively (Aarts et al., 2005;
Metcalfe and Greene, 2007), etc. The two predominant experi-
mental approaches have addressed (1) the “intentional binding”
effect, i.e., the subjective compression of the time between a vol-
untary action and its experienced sensory outcome (Haggard
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et al., 2002; Moore and Obhi, 2012) and (2) the “comparator
model,” which posits that the sense of agency results from a senso-
rimotor matching between a predicted and the actual state (for a
comprehensive overview and discussion see Synofzik et al., 2008).
As a consequence, neuroscientific operationalizations of agency
have been diverse (David et al., 2008), with the employment of
a sensorimotor mismatch being the most common (see Sperduti
et al., 2011). In contrast, and unfortunately, we hardly know any-
thing about the brain basis of intentional binding (Moore and
Obhi, 2012), with the exception of Moore et al. (2010) who
showed that interruption of the pre-supplementary motor area
(pre-SMA) via TMS interfered with intentional binding.
However, there is now reason to believe that the sense of agency
is “the product of several contributory elements” (Gallagher,
2012), cues (Wegner and Sparrow, 2004; Moore et al., 2009) or
processes (Christoff et al., 2011). Synofzik and colleagues (2008;
Vosgerau and Synofzik, 2012; also Moore and Fletcher, 2012)
proposed a multifactorial weighting model, in which internal
cues from efferent, reafferent, intention, and environment inter-
act dynamically, following principles of optimal cue integration
given a situation. Thus, a more topical neuroscience experiment
would consider many different agency cues at the same time,
going beyond the mere interruption of the sense of agency by
sensorimotor incongruence. Tsakiris and coworkers (2010) made
an attempt toward a “multifactorial experiment.” They let their
participants perform active finger movements or passively lifted
the participants’ fingers, while providing synchronous or delayed
visual feedback of these finger movements via video. The authors
(2010) found the biggest self-agency experience when active
movements were performed under synchronous feedback. This
condition was associated with increased activity in the medial
aspect of the premotor cortex (i.e., the SMA). In contrast, the infe-
rior parietal lobule showed higher activation for asynchronous
visual feedback, particularly when the movement was passively
induced. Similarly, Desmurget and colleagues (2009) dissociated
premotor and inferior parietal cortex in patients undergoing
invasive electrical stimulation. Experiments like these help to elu-
cidate what a given “neural correlate of the sense of agency”
truly reflects, while also allowing for predictions with respect to
network activity.
NEURAL NETWORKS AND NETWORK INTERACTIONS
UNDERLYING THE SENSE OF AGENCY
The previous section highlighted the need of a full-fledged
account of the sense of agency, capable of integrating the presently
available neuroscientific evidence. Despite the fact that highly dis-
tributed networks underlie most cognitive processes, an explicit
account of how the “neural correlates of agency” interact dur-
ing agentic processing is missing to date. Only two out of
the more than 30 identified neuroimaging studies of agency
(Sperduti et al., 2011) investigated network activity by measur-
ing “functional connectivity” (David et al., 2007; Nahab et al.,
2011). Functional connectivity seeks to identify highly connected
brain regions based on time course correlations of their activity
(Sporns et al., 2004). The author and her coworkers (David et al.,
2007), for instance, revealed correlated activity of the insula and
somatosensory cortex for visual feedback correctly experienced
as self-generated, on the one hand, and between the premo-
tor cortex, cerebellum, and posterior parietal cortex for visual
feedback correctly experienced as experimenter-generated, on the
other hand. Nahab and colleagues (2011) identified three dif-
ferent networks that were active when participants lost control
of moving a virtual hand on the screen. Nahab and colleagues
(2011) referred to these regions as a mismatch detection network,
which was characterized by fast and high-amplitude hemody-
namic responses (e.g., in the insula and inferior parietal lobule),
and a slower, low-amplitude higher-order processing network
(e.g., the prefrontal and posterior parietal cortices). These two
networks appeared to be relayed in a third category of brain
regions (e.g., cerebellum and basal ganglia).
What remained unclear from Nahab and colleagues’ (2011)
elegant study was whether and how the three functionally dif-
ferent networks feed into and back to each other. Functional
connectivity approaches do not allow for such directional (or
causal) assumptions about the influence one network might exert
over another (this type of connectivity is termed “effective”;
Sporns et al., 2004). Effective connectivity has been successfully
assessed for processes related to the sense of agency such as grasp-
ing (Grol et al., 2007) and consciousness (Boly et al., 2011) but not
for agentic processing. For example, Grol and coworkers revealed
that depending on on-line control requirements of a move-
ment, different cortical networks are activated: e.g., grasping large
objects increased effective connectivity in a dorsomedial network,
grasping small objects in a dorsolateral network. Although neuro-
computational models of the sense of agency—similar to those
developed for the mirror neuron system or sensorimotor con-
trol (e.g., Franklin and Wolpert, 2011)—are lacking to date, an
anatomically plausible model of cortical regions interacting dur-
ing agency situations could be initiated based on what we know
from related disciplines or comparative (e.g., anatomical connec-
tivity studies in the monkey) and neuropsychological data. For
example, Desmurget and coworkers impressively demonstrated
that stimulation of the inferior parietal cortex in awake patients
undergoing brain surgery triggered movement intentions or an
increased (illusory) awareness that a movement has been per-
formed, while stimulation of premotor regions led to the actual
execution of movements without the patients’ awareness. Such
findings should be incorporated into a neuroanatomical model
of the sense of agency, which could then be subsequently tested
by “dynamic causal modeling” (DCM). DCM represents a com-
putational approach, which estimates directed influences between
variables within a Bayesian framework (Stephan and Friston,
2010)—a promising avenue in light of recent suggestions that
the sense of agency may likewise be based on Bayesian principles
(Moore and Fletcher, 2012).
BEYOND LOCI: TEMPORAL ASPECTS OF AGENTIC
PROCESSING
Connectivity can also be assessed with other neuroscience tech-
niques such as EEG or MEG, which allow for frequency-resolved
analyses of correlations between brain regions or networks
(Siegel et al., 2012), for example, by the computation of phase
synchronization and spectral coherence, power-power correla-
tions, spectral granger causality, or cross-frequency couplings
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(Cohen et al., 2011). Due to their excellent temporal resolution,
EEG and MEG allow us to answer questions about the tim-
ing aspects of various processes underlying the sense of agency.
Answering these questions becomes also relevant for two recent—
and related—discussions about: (1) possible indices and the rela-
tionship of pre-reflective versus reflective level of action awareness
(Gallagher, 2000, 2012; Synofzik et al., 2008); (2) whether the
sense of agency is primarily based on sensorimotor prediction
versus cognitive reconstruction/inference (Haggard, 2005; Moore
and Obhi, 2012).
With respect to these discussions, Gentsch and Schütz-
Bosbach (2011; see also Kühn et al., 2011) recently observed a
reduced N1 component, that is, a negative deflection at 100ms
post-stimulus onset, for a visual stimulus that was self- as opposed
to computer-generated. This was taken as the EEG correlate
of sensorimotor attenuation, a predictive mechanism for the
expected sensory consequences of one’s own actions (Blakemore
et al., 1998), and an indicator of the pre-reflective level of
agency—as this effect is not necessarily associated with correct
agency judgments (Kühn et al., 2011). Instead, a later positive
deflection in the EEG (i.e., the so-called P3a component peaking
at 250–280ms) was increased on trials that were afterwards (i.e.,
long after 300ms) evaluated as self-generated (Kühn et al., 2011).
These results not only provided evidence for potential EEG corre-
lates of pre-reflective versus reflective agency, but also suggested
that both levels of the sense of agency are better characterized
by early predictive processes. However, findings showing (1) a
dissociation between subjective movement awareness/intention
and movement execution (Desmurget et al., 2009); (2) that we
can also feel causally effective even for events out of our con-
trol (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999) and (3) that we have a general
bias to over-attribute external events to ourselves (van den Bos
and Jeannerod, 2002) suggest the opposite. Moreover, Obhi and
colleagues (Strother et al., 2010; Obhi and Hall, 2011) provided
evidence for a dissociation between pre-reflective and reflective
agency, as assessed by the intentional binding effect and self-
reported judgments about agency in a joint-action setting (i.e.,
several actors), suggesting that both levels of the sense of agency
are supported by different processes.
Thus, a reconciliatory view, emerging from recent behavioral
data, posits that both prediction and reconstruction constitute the
sense of agency but that they are differently weighted for some
situations compared to others: e.g., the role of reconstructive pro-
cesses increases when sensorimotor signals are weak (Moore et al.,
2009; Voss et al., 2010; Gentsch et al., 2012; Moore and Obhi,
2012). Identifying the functional basis of a reflective versus pre-
reflective level of agency represents a necessary step for future
research in the field.
To date, only a few authors explicitly approached the sense
of agency with EEG (Gentsch and Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; Kühn
et al., 2011; Gentsch et al., 2012), exclusively focusing on event-
related potentials. This classical approach, however, can tell us
only little about temporal brain dynamics occurring during agen-
tic processing; rather, it represents a static snapshot of the brain’s
activity at the scalp level (Makeig et al., 2004). Future EEG
(or MEG) experiments addressing the sense of agency may want
to profit from recent methodological/technological advances,
which suggest novel and more sophisticated analyses. These are
capable of modeling ongoing brain dynamics, such as time-
frequency representations of underlying field potentials (i.e., at
the source level), while also allowing researchers to measure
dynamic interactions between the nodes of a possible agency
network (Makeig et al., 2004; Siegel et al., 2012). This appears
to be a more appropriate approach, given the recent conceptual
developments of the sense of agency as a dynamic multifactorial
weighting process.
ECOLOGICAL VALIDITY
Critical voices rightfully questioned the ecological validity of
many agency paradigms for several reasons. First, most paradigms
that manipulated sensorimotor contingencies, such as cursor
movements deviating from minimal joystick movements (Farrer
and Frith, 2002; David et al., 2007) or sounds/shapes deviat-
ing from associated button presses (Spengler et al., 2009; Kühn
et al., 2011), investigated effects on disembodied or extracorpo-
real events as operationalization of an embodied phenomenon.
Second, participants might process such paradigms differently,
both phenomenologically and neurally, compared to when they
can see/feel their own hands and bodies. Third, many opera-
tionalizations of agency “imposed binary outcomes to what is
likely a complex and dynamic cognitive process” (Nahab et al.,
2011).
As a neuroscientist investigating the sense of agency, I am
aware of the limitations cognitive neuroscience techniques
impose on the idea of increased ecological validity. First, partici-
pants are restricted in the movements they can make in magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) and encephalographic (EEG) environ-
ments, to prevent causing artifacts in the recording of neural data.
Second, increasing ecological validity goes in hand with increas-
ing complexity and the question what of a given “neural correlate”
really reflects (compare to Yomogida et al., 2010). However, recent
work suggested several ways to trading off such limitations and
ecological validity (e.g., David et al., 2006, 2007). VR techniques,
in particular, provide a promising avenue, also for simulating and
rehabilitating disorders of action monitoring/awareness (Ionta
et al., 2011; Verschure, 2011). In several studies, Blanke and his
coworkers demonstrated the application of VR along with fMRI
or EEG (Ionta et al., 2011; Lenggenhager et al., 2011). For exam-
ple, Lenggenhager and colleagues (2011) used VR technology
and visuotactile conflict to manipulate self-localization. Wearing
an EEG cap and optical markers attached to their bodies, par-
ticipants were placed within a VR tracking arena. The signals
provided by these markers were fed into a real-time animated,
life-sized virtual character, which appeared on a large projection
screen in front of them. Employing a variation of the rubber-hand
illusion paradigm (Lenggenhager et al., 2007), the authors then
recorded EEG during the synchronous or asynchronous stroking
of the participants and the avatar’s back. Although these studies
(Ionta et al., 2011; Lenggenhager et al., 2011) rather address the
sense of body ownership, similar scenarios could be developed
to address the sense of agency by contrasting conditions of, for
example, present vs. lacking motor intentions, matching vs. mis-
matching efferent, and reafferent signals, etc., while measuring
the degree of agentic experience in the VR.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The sense of agency represents an intriguing phenomenon,
amenable to cognitive neuroscience techniques despite its com-
plexity. Although we have just started to elucidate the functional
anatomy of the sense of agency, “methodological stagnation”
already characterizes cognitive neuroscience approaches to the
sense of agency. Recent conceptual developments, on the one
hand, and general technological or methodological develop-
ments, on the other hand, allow for novel experimental paradigms
and analyses, which could—in turn—feed back into further
conceptual developments of the sense of agency. Thus, the
neuroscience of the sense of agency remains topical, offering
several interesting, evident, and necessary leads for further explo-
ration.
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